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Open Badges: the open standard behind verifiable credentials

An Open Badge is a digital credential described by an open standard: who received what, when, and from whom, stored as a machine-readable document at a fixed address. Anyone can check that address, and no vendor can lock it away exclusively. This page explains the standard so you can place it and put it to use yourself afterwards. If you are looking for the announcement image for your event, the thing people casually also call a “badge”: that is covered on Create a LinkedIn badge.

What an Open Badge is, in one paragraph

An Open Badge is a digital credential for an achievement or attendance, described according to the Open Badges specification. It was originally developed by Mozilla and is maintained today by 1EdTech (formerly IMS Global). The core idea: every detail about the credential lives as a structured, publicly retrievable document at a fixed URL. Anyone who wants to check the credential simply requests that URL. In version 2.0, the one this page is about, every credential consists of three linked documents: Issuer, BadgeClass and Assertion.

The three building blocks: Issuer, BadgeClass, Assertion

The standard splits a credential into three parts, and the separation is smarter than it first looks. The Issuer describes who awards it: name, website, contact. The BadgeClass describes what is awarded: the credential's title, description, criteria and image. The Assertion is the individual award: this one person received this BadgeClass on this date.

That way the description of a certificate type only has to exist once, whether you award it to 20 people or 2,000. Here is what a real assertion from our system looks like, with only the token shortened:

Assertion (Open Badges 2.0, hosted)
{
  "@context": "https://w3id.org/openbadges/v2",
  "type": "Assertion",
  "id": "https://oneclickbadge.com/ob/assertion/3f9d…",
  "badge": "https://oneclickbadge.com/ob/badge/3f9d…",
  "recipient": {
    "type": "url",
    "hashed": false,
    "identity": "https://oneclickbadge.com/cert/3f9d…"
  },
  "issuedOn": "2026-07-04T18:22:31Z",
  "verification": { "type": "hosted" },
  "evidence": "https://oneclickbadge.com/cert/3f9d…"
}

Two details are worth a second look. The badge field is only an address: the BadgeClass lives there, and it in turn points to the Issuer, so a verification tool works its way along the whole chain. And the recipient here is the address of the certificate page; no email address, not even a hashed one, appears anywhere. The public document therefore gets by without any direct contact details. The person's name sits on the linked certificate page, where they entered it themselves when they claimed it.

Hosted or signed: two ways to verify

The specification knows two ways to make an assertion verifiable. With signed badges, the document carries a cryptographic signature from the issuer, so it proves itself, but that requires key management on the issuer's side. With hosted badges a simpler rule applies: the assertion is genuine as long as it can be retrieved at its own id address from the issuer. Verifying then just means requesting the URL and comparing.

The hosted approach has an underrated advantage: the clean revocation. When the issuer withdraws a credential, the same address answers from that point on with HTTP status 410 and a short document carrying the line “revoked: true”. A withdrawn certificate does not simply go quiet, it actively signals that it is no longer valid. That is how we handle it at OneClickBadge too, for instance when a certificate was issued twice by mistake.

The image carries the credential piggyback

One detail of the standard is almost poetic: “baking”. The badge graphic, usually a PNG, gets its assertion together with the verification address embedded directly into the image file, technically as an iTXt text block with the keyword openbadges. The image looks exactly the same afterwards, yet it carries its verification path within it: drop the file into a verification tool and you land at the assertion, no matter how many downloads and chats the image has travelled through.

The order of priority still matters: only the hosted assertion can prove anything. An image can be copied and altered at will, while the answer at the credential's address is controlled by the issuer alone.

Open Badges and LinkedIn: what works and what doesn't

Here we clear up the most common misunderstanding that haunts so many articles: LinkedIn does not read Open Badge metadata. There is no badge import, no automatic check, no special icon for verified badges. What LinkedIn has is the profile section “Licenses & certifications” with fields for a name, an issuing organization and a URL. None of that means LinkedIn has certified or endorsed anything.

That does not make the standard useless for LinkedIn, quite the opposite: the verification address belongs in the URL field. When someone clicks “Show credential” in the profile, they land on the certificate page, behind which the verifiable assertion sits. The entry itself can be prepared for recipients in a single click, with the form fields already filled in. What this looks like from the attendees' side is shown in the guide to adding it to your profile.

Licenses & certifications
C
Certificate of attendance, Cloud Summit 2026
Cloud Summit (via OneClickBadge)
Issued July 2026
Show credential
Example for an attendee, in the Licenses & certifications section of the profile.

Issuing Open Badges without turning it into an IT project

Implementing the standard yourself pays off for very few organizers: you would need permanently reachable endpoints for the Issuer, the BadgeClass and every single Assertion, plus revocation logic and a baked image. For events, webinars and training courses there is a ready-made route: at OneClickBadge you design an attendance certificate, and every issued copy automatically gets its hosted assertion, the revocation mechanism and the PDF with the image.

Distributing it to many attendees works without a list upload, through a self-service link you share after the event. Why this is also a privacy decision when it comes to credentials is covered on Certificates for many attendees.

And what about Open Badges 3.0?

Version 3.0 moves the standard onto W3C Verifiable Credentials, a model with cryptographic signatures and more control on the recipient's side. For higher-education ecosystems and long-lived educational records, that is the right direction. For the event-attendance use case, 2.0 in its hosted form is the pragmatic state of play today: every common verification tool understands it, revocation works, and nobody has to manage wallets or keys. That is why we rely on 2.0 hosted and keep watching 3.0 calmly.

Related

Frequently asked questions

Does LinkedIn recognize or verify Open Badges?
No. LinkedIn does not read the metadata and checks nothing; the Licenses & certifications section simply accepts a name, an organization and a URL. The verifiability comes from the issuer: the URL leads to the certificate page, behind which the hosted assertion can be retrieved at any time.
What is the difference between an Open Badge and a PDF certificate?
The PDF is a file, the Open Badge is a retrievable state. Anyone can pass on or recreate a PDF, and no one notices. The assertion sits with the issuer, can be checked by machine and revoked when needed. In practice you need both: the PDF for the folder and the printer, the credential link for anything that should be verifiable.
Do recipients need an account or a wallet?
Not for Open Badges 2.0 in its hosted form. The credential is a public URL, the image and the PDF are ordinary files. At OneClickBadge, attendees claim their certificate via a link and add it to their LinkedIn profile through us, without signing in.
What does it cost to issue Open Badges?
The standard itself costs nothing, it is open. At OneClickBadge you create an event and set up the certificate and its hosted credential with a free account; what applies beyond that you see as you create it. Recipients never pay anything and need no account.
Are Open Badges tamper-proof?
The hosted assertion is, within the limits of the method: it is valid exactly when it sits at its id address on the issuer's server, and anyone wanting to forge that would have to control that server. The image itself stays copyable, so the reliable part is always the address behind it.

Sources

Details about external platforms last checked on July 12, 2026.